In a recent study of voting in Des Moines, Iowa, Robert Salisbury and Gordon Black assessed the effects of party affiliation and class composition on voting results in three kinds of elections--partisan, nonpartisan, and referenda. 1 They found that party affiliation accounted for more of the variation than did class in partisan elections, a finding of no great surprise but one which underlines again the inordinate emphasis placed on social class groupings by some of the early voting studies. The authors also reported that party loomed more important than did class in local nonpartisan elections although the range of variation was greater than for partisan contests. This is a finding of some moment and goes to the heart of the question concerning the significance of parties and partisans in de jure nonpartisan systems and to the articulation of local with state and national politics. Finally, the Des Moines study indicated no strong relationships between either party or class and the vote in three out of four referenda (the exception being a vote on the city manager plan). 3However, in their four-city study Williams and Adrian report moderate to strong correlations between party and class and the support of councilsponsored referenda.
Williams and Adrian, chapter 5. A study of referenda in the Cleveland area revealed a negative correlations between Democratic voting and pro-metropolitan integration proposals, but the average "yes" vote on 45 referenda showed no meaningful correlation with Democratic voting. James A. Norton, "Referenda Voting in a Metropolitan Area," Western Political Quarterlz, 16 (March, 1963), 195-212. -2-touches on the important questions of the programmatic or nonprogrammatic nature of local politics, and the interplay of class and party interests (whether latent or manifest) in the local political system.
The authors of the Des Moines report wisely suggested that their findings should be regarded as specific to that city, and urged further analysis of other cities.
In response to this suggestion and as part of a continuing research interest,4 we have undertaken a partial replication of that study in the city of Atlanta, Georgia. One may immediately say that comparisons between Atlanta and Des Moines will surely produce discrepancies because of the obvious differences of the political cultures involved. This, of course, is precisely the point. The advancement of knowledge and theory about urban pdlitical systems, both as locales of extra-city politics and as political entities unto themselves, comes only with the observation of similar variables at work in different settings.
In addition to reporting on the replication of the main portions of the Des Moines study, we shall also relate the results of additional analysis.
Specifically, we shall present a comparison of interelection voting results, the presence of status polarization in the electorate, the changing nature of ethnic voting, and the interrelationships between voting coalitions and ruling coalitions in Atlanta.
-3-between 1954 and 1964. They may be divided into four types:
A.
Partisan (4) --1956 and 1960 Presidential; 1956 and 1962 Congressional.5 B.
Democratic primaries (4) --1954 and 1962 congressional (5th district); 1958 and 1962 gubernatorial. C.
Nonpartisan local (2) --1957 general and 1961
run-off primary maycralty. Referenda (3) --1962 and 1963 bond issues; 7 1964 legal liquor (by the glass).
Thus we have the three kinds of contests used in the Des nines study (though not as many of each kind) plus an additional one--Democratic primaries.
It should be noted that Georgia had, until recently, an open primary system for partisan offices, which in practice means a Democratic primary.
The electorates for primary and general elections are potentially the same and, aside from differential rates of turnout, this has apparently facilitated a fairly high degree of overlap between primary and general balloting.
Electoral results in these 13 elections for each of Atlanta's 69 pre5These were the only elections covering the entire city in the ten-year period which were seriously contested by both parties. 6 Mayoralty contests were utilized because, like the city council elections in Des Moines--where the mayor is selected by the council--these were considered the most significant nonpartisan local elections. 7 There was also a bond referendum in 1957 but, unfortunately for our purposes, the precinct returns were not preserved. We also found in related research, that the gubernatorial primary returns of 1962 had not been recorded by precinct level in neighboring DeKalb County. Such occurrences should serve as an admonition to scholars and researchers to acquire such data at the time they are available and to encourage local governing bodies to establish voting archives.
-4-cincts constitute the dependent variables. 8 The independent variables include the two used in the Des Moines--class and party -.plus the additional one of race. The operational procedures require some explanation, especially since none are exactly the same as those used in the Des Moines -research.
Utilizing census tract data, a measure of class was constructed from three components: the percentage of persons twenty-five years of age and over with no more than eighth grade education; the percentage of families with incomes of $5,000 or less; and the percentage of males fourteen years of age and older employed in an unskilled occupation.
An average of these three measures was taken and then subtracted from 100. This produced an index score in which the higher scores indicate higher class (or socioeconomic) status. Since census tracts and precincts do not coincide, it was necessary to superimpose census tract maps upon precinct maps and estimate the overlap.9 In this fashion, each of the 69 precincts was assigned a score on the class index. Due to the generally high intercorrelations of socio-economic indicators, we believe that this measure is reasonably comparable to the housing index used in the Des Moines study.
10
The construction of the measure of partisanship presents some difficulties in a traditionally one-party state. In addition, since Georgia 8 In a few cases, precinct boundaries were altered for specific elections.
This usually meant combining adjacent precincts for polling purposes. Approximations for the "missing precincts" were developed.
9 For the method employed see Walter Kaufman and Scott Greer, "Voting in a Metropolitan Community: An Application of Social Area Analysis," Social Forces, 28 (March, 1960), 196204. 10 We did find in related research, however, that the use of a housing index developed from Bureau of the Census data did not prove as discriminating a measure in the Atlanta area as did the class index we developed. the range is from a low of a 26% average Democratic vote in one precinct to a high of 75% in another, with the median being 61°A and the mean 57%. Hence, it is no fanciful or misleading venture in statistical manipulation to speak of a partisan voting index in Atlanta.
Our third independent variable, race, was not used in the Des Moines study due to the paucity of non-Caucasians in the mid-Western city (5% in 1960).
In Atlanta, however, any analysis of electoral behavior would be inadequate without a consideration of Negro participation in elections. As Jack Walker has shown,
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Negro registration increased dramatically after the white primary was outlawed. Since mid-1946, the (estimated) percentage 11 "Negro Voting in Atlanta: 1954 -61," Phylon, 24 (No. 4, 1963 9 379-87.
-6-of Negro registrants out of all registered voters in the city of Atlanta has never dropped below 25 %, and in 1962 the proportion stood at 34%. Moreover, there is a strong suggestion, in mayoralty elections at least, that the Negroes turn out in higher proportions than do whites, and that (again in mayoralty elections) they vote more cohesively than do whites. Inclusion of the racial composition of the precincts is thus crucial in sorting out the effects of class and party as well as being of inherent interest in terms of ethnic voting. The operational measure of racial composition, again using census tract data, was the percentage of the precinct described as non
We shall first consider the association between these three variables--class, party, and race--and electoral outcomes in four kinds of elections.
The modes of analysis will be simple and partial product-moment correlations.
Although we present both simple and partial correlation coefficients in the tables, our discussion will rest primarily on the partials.
Voting Behavior in Four Types of Elections
Partisan elections.
In examining partisan elections we have related the three independent variables to the percentage of the vote for Democratic candidates. Table 1 presents these findings. In a superficially non-competitive city we find that the partisan variable has occasionally powerful, but highly flexible, explanatory ability. It should be noted that the correlation between the 12 Registration figures are available by race but since we were interested in characterizing the precinct as a whole, and not just the registered voters, and since census data were employed to develop the class index, we have relied on census data to classify the precincts by racial composition. Democratic primary elections.
In looking at these primaries, we relate our three variables to the percentage of the vote for the more liberal of the two major candidates. Here we see that class becomes a more significant variable than in partisan elections (see Table 2 ). In two of the elections under analysis, class is of equal or greater significance than is party. Although primary elections were not examined in the Des Moines study, little difference was found between partisan and nonpartisan elections.
In the South class may be more important in primaries than in general contests because of the fact that primary elections are more crucial to the electorate and offer more genuine choices.
In a sense, we can learn more about the ideology of a precinct by examining its votes in primary and nonpartisan elections rather than in partisan ones.
More significant than the size and variation in the correlations is the fact that in every case there is a negative correlation between Democratic strength and vote for the more liberal candidate. The strongest Democratic precincts are low-income white (the partial correlation between the class and the Democratic indexes, with race controlled, is -.70) vigorously segregationist and, as we shall see, conservative in local affairs. In examining Table 2 one is struck by the aptness of Banfield and Wilson's comment that "...the words 'Republican' and 'Democratic' do not necessarily mean the same thing in local as in state and national politics. Sometimes, indeed, the meanings are (so far as they have application to the local situation) reversed. That the Democratic party is'more 'liberal' than the-Republican in national affairs does not prevent it from being more 'conservative,' or even 'reactionary,'
in the affairs of some cities. Yet it was during Vandiver's administration that the University of Georgia was integrated without interference from the Governor's office. From this episode Vandiver's image became that of a "reasonable" Southerner. 17 It seems likely that this curious pattern is also partly a consequence of working with grouped data. Operational procedures for classifying the precincts by race and class for grouping purposes are given in Table 8 . proposed policies roughly comparable to those of Vandiver, and the assumption was that Sanders ran with Vandiver's support. Sanders appeared to be carrying on the Vandiver tradition. However, while the policies of the successive administrations are similar, the political support for the two men was dissimilar. Sanders' average vote in Negro precincts (94%) was Lonsiderably higher than in white precincts (67%).
Mayoralty elections.
Local elections are legally nonpartisan in Atlanta. We now consider two significant mayoralty contests--the 1957 and 1961 contests in which moderates prevailed over the extremist, Lester Maddox. Table 3 indicates that the Democratic index is roughly as powerful in nonpartisan local elections as it is in either of the two partisan elections of the 1960's. Further, party is slightly more significant than class in these nonpartisam elections and is about as significant as racial composition. This situation clearly does not support the traditional assumption that nonpartisan elections mask party orientations and that cleavages will fall along non-party lines. *For 1957 this is the percentage of the vote for William Hartsfield, the winner, and in 1961 this is the percentage for Ivan Allen, also the winner. **Partial correlations are with the two remaining variables controlled.
-13-An alternative explanation, then, is that the more "Democratic" the precinct, the more it is populated by people with a tenacious addiction to the status quo, that there is an ideology common to them which sets them apart from less Democratic precincts.
Hence, in mayoralty contests we find a consistent negative correlation between Democratic strength and the vote for more liberal candidates, a pattern we also observed in Democratic primaries.
Atlanta is apparently quite similar to Des Moines in that both cities reveal a substantial correlation between partisan variables and votes in nonpartisan elections. Referenda.
The pivotal role of Negroes in Atlanta's elections can also be seen quite clearly by examining three local referenda (see Table 4 ). It is certainly true that the increased support given to the bond issue
by Negro electorates was a crucial factor in the success of Mayor Allen's program. In the predominantly Negro precincts, the favorable vote increased from 58% to 81 %; in the upper class white precincts from 47% to 61%4 in the middle class precincts from 30% to 46%; and it increased in the lower class
20
An essential part of the campaign against the bond issues was that the money was to be spent for integrated facilities. Recreational facilities were especially singled out in this accusation. Table 5 .
_14(a)-
While the explanatory power of class, party, and race fluctuates somewhat, this power is generally of a very strong magnitude. In ten of the thirteen elections the variation accounted for is over 70% and in no case is the figure below 50%. As Donald Matthews and James Prothro note in another context, "To explain over one-fourth of the variance in Negro registration--or any other significant political phenomenon--is no mean achievement in From the material presented thus far, one might conclude that there may be persistent patternE characterizing the distribution of precinct balloting in Atlanta. For example, it seems likely--in view of the strong correlations produced by either class, party, or race--that there would be high intercorrelations in the voting for moderate mayoralty candidates and for "progressive" referenda.
On the other hand, the "mix" of electoral components may be sufficiently different to minimize such positive relationships.
As a first step, let us consider the data which bear on the example just offered.
The coefficients of correlation presented in Table 6 indicate remarkably high associations. There is no doubt that the contour of voting aligned with Hartsfield was followed by a similar one for his successor in -19(a)- There is here a common thread of distrust and apprehension of what the new politics--with its increased taxes, equality for the races, and liberal sounding leadership--will do to the old modes of political, social, and economic life.
The authors of the Des Moines study, while not reporting on direct interelection comparisons, infer little association between voting in nonpartisan elections and referenda. Although we have examined a restricted number of elections, our feeling is that the lines of congruence found here would also be found were we to look at other contests. The issue cleavages in the local political system transcend nonpartisan and referenda balloting.
Because we are particularly interested in the electoral alliances in local balloting, let us examine the associations between results in these elections with those in Democratic primaries and partisan contests. As Table 7 reveals, the moderate-progressive electoral coalition on local elections has its sequel in the Democratic primaries. The proportion of a precinct's vote going to moderate mayoralty candidates and progressive measures is directly and highly related to the proportion of the vote for the more -.14 *The computed correlations are those between moderate and progressive voting in the local elections and with voting for the more liberal candidate in the Democratic primaries and the Democratic candidate in the partisan elections. **Due in large part to the fact that Ernest Vandiver secured extremely high support from most precincts in the 1958 Gubernatorial primary, interelection comparisons resulted in insignificant coefficients and are not presented in this table. It was also found that voting percentages for liberal candidates in Democratic primaries show a decided negative correlation with the support received by Democratic candidates in partisan elections. Conversely, it may be inferred that Republican-prone electorates, while more liberal on local and primary elections, identify with a brand of politics (Republican) at the national level which ordinarily pursues more conservative policies than does the Democratic party.
Status Polarization
Key elements of the voting alliances described previously have discernable socio-political characteristics which tend to bind them together.
It
should not be assumed, however, that the various members of these alliances exist in perfect political harmony. We have suggested that Negroes play an inordinately crucial role in the electoral coalitions. It may also be true that cooperation between Negro and high social class white electorates varies considerably depending upon the type of the election. We would infer, for example, that the cooperation between Negro and white groups is greatest when the issues are purely local and least when the issues are national. This is true because the alliance is, at best, an unnatural one depending for its existence upon the unique properties of Atlanta politics.
To examine this idea further, we have employed the index of class voting, a modification of a device first used by Robert Alford. *For the purpose of this Table, all precincts with a Negro population of 50% or more are considered predominately Negro.
Of the 17 precincts so designated, most range toward a high proportion of Negroes, as these figures indicate: 50-60% (2); 60-70% (1); 70-80% (3); 80-90% (4); 90-100% (7).
On the basis of their Class Index scores, the 69 precincts were divided into three equal groups of lower, middle, and upper class.
Under this scheme there emerged nine lower class white precincts (i.e., with a Negro population under 50%), 14 lower class Negro precincts, 20 middle class white precincts, three middle class Negro precincts (not included in the Table) , and 23 upper class white precincts. **Entries are the differences between the average votes of precincts being compared.
The higher the entry the greater the antagonism or "class" component of the vote. There is a reciprocal relationship, sometimes delicate and sometimes crude, among the elements of the coalition.
In Atlanta the electoral tandem of Negro and upper class white voters has produced, and been produced by, a similar coalition in the upper reaches of the decision-making structure. To a great extent the coalitions at both levels are tacit rather than formal. For the most part, during the last On the other hand, as long as upper class Republican and Democratic partisans--expecially the former--subscribe to progressive politics at the local level, the electoral coalition will probably persist. And so long as this coalition prevails in decisive elections, it seems likely that the ruling coalition will also remain intact.
